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In his book "Who Killed Daniel Pearl?", which is about the kidnapping and murder of an American journalist in Pakistan by Islamist terrorists, the well-known French writer Bernard-Henry Levy refers to his conversation with an Indian intelligence official in New Delhi. "It seems you've just been in Pakistan," the official says. "How are those lunatics?" Not long ago, an Indian writer on strategic affairs described his visit to Pakistan as a trip to meet "our slightly demented cousins". The common Indian attitude towards the Pakistani establishment remains a mixture of amused contempt and intense dislike. It is possible the Indian psyche has yet to get over - it probably never will - a suppressed anger over the role the political masters of Pakistan played in, first, dividing the sub-continent and then harbouring an apparently not-so-secret desire to permanently cripple India. One must hasten to add, however, that this feeling of antipathy is directed almost solely at the rulers in Islamabad, and particularly Pakistan's military and intelligence wings. It doesn't colour the Indian attitude towards the average Pakistanis. As the recent cricket series have shown, there is an enormous fund of goodwill between the ordinary people of the two countries. The sight of the Indian spectators waving Pakistani flags and Pakistanis waving Indian flags during the matches was a heart-warming one. It is not impossible that this bonhomie - all Indians have experienced the warmth with which they are greeted in Pakistan - is a cause of concern to hawks on both sides of the border. If the ubiquitous Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan is unhappy about the camaraderie, the Hindutva brigade in India too is equally perturbed. It is routinely argued, therefore, that whenever the peace talks between the two countries seem to make any headway, the terrorists strike. It is not yet clear whether the Mumbai bombings were a similar attempt. But what is undeniable is that there has been a perceptible increase in the number of terrorist outrages in Kashmir and outside. As a result, if there is any other major incident like the one in Mumbai, the peace talks, which have been temporarily suspended, may be almost permanently derailed. It will be futile for Pakistan, and the international community, including the US, to claim that India hasn't always been able to produce irrefutable evidence of Pakistani involvement in the acts of terrorism. As long as the pubic perception in India remains firm in the belief in Islamabad's complicity, which is enhanced by books like "Who Killed Daniel Pearl?", the Indian government will find it nearly impossible to continue the dialogue with the Pervez Musharraf regime as if nothing has happened. It is obvious that the Indian suspicion is fuelled by misgivings about the role of the army in Pakistan. The fact that the three major confrontations between the two countries - in 1965, 1971 and 1999 - have taken place when the army was in charge in Pakistan is not forgotten in India. If Mohammed Ayub Khan was the man in uniform presiding over Pakistan's destiny in 1965, it was Yahya Khan in 1971 and Musharraf in 1999. It is also known that civilians were in charge on the few occasions when the two countries reached agreement - the Nehru-Liaquat Ali pact and the Simla agreement between Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Atal Bihari Vajpayee's path-breaking Lahore trip also took place when Nawaz Sharif was prime minister - a post from which he was dislodged by Musharraf's coup. To most Indians, Pakistan is not so much a genuine nation with a thriving civil society as a dysfunctional country (a 'failed' one, according to some Western assessments) in the fatal grip of the army. The conviction, therefore, is that it is not Pakistani society that determines the country's policies, but the army, with its task made all the more easy by the absence of democracy. If civilians had really been in charge in Pakistan, they would have known that the encouragement of fundamentalism might keep Kashmir on the boil and the rest of India on tenterhooks. But it will also keep the sectarian fires burning in Pakistan. But to the army, the threat to civil society in Pakistan is apparently less important than 'bleeding India with a thousand cuts', as its strategy is supposed to be. It is in this context that Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee's contention that the terror infrastructure in Pakistan remains intact is of importance. Arguably, the increase in the number of terrorist outrages is the result of the realization in the Pakistani establishment that time is running out for it. For a start, the fact that India is steadily pulling ahead of Pakistan, and at an increasingly faster rate, is becoming clear. It isn't only the India-US nuclear deal which has underscored this point, which is so galling for Pakistan; in the matter of the economy too, as well as the growing worldwide appreciation for India's multicultural democracy, Pakistan's longstanding rival is now way out in front. The old Pakistani wish of parity between the two countries, to which Musharraf referred recently, can no longer be sustained. A rather pathetic attempt in maintaining an equality of status was the Pakistani move to field a candidate for the UN secretary-general's post after India decided to back Shashi Tharoor. To add salt to the wound, this realization of Pakistan falling back has come on top of the fear that the dream of wresting Kashmir from India is slipping away. The Kargil incursion of 1999 was the army's last throw of the dice, apparently conceived behind Nawaz Sharif's back, if the latter is telling the truth. This misadventure was supposed to culminate the decade-long proxy war that Pakistan had been waging via the jehadis in Kashmir. But its failure, followed by America's entry into the region to fight terrorism, has relieved the pressure on India. The only ray of hope for the Pakistani establishment now is the support that the jehadis are receiving from a small section of Indian Muslims, reacting in anger and disillusionment to the demolition of the Babri masjid and the Gujarat riots by the Hindu extremists. But it isn't a threat India cannot counter. But for a resumption of the mutual talks, there has to be a perceptible decline in the acts of terrorism, for no Indian government can ignore the suspicion of Pakistani involvement. (Amulya Ganguli is a political analyst. He can be reached at aganguli@mail.com)
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